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INTRODUCTION
Qualified immunity, as it was developed in the early 1970s, was
designed to prevent police officers from being held civilly liable for
constitutional rights violations that were not “clearly established.” 1
The rationale behind this formulation was based in pragmatism as
much as justice; an officer should not be held accountable for
violating a right that she did not know existed, but it also benefits
* Anthony Stauber is a JD candidate at Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
1. See Qualified Immunity, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://
www.law.cornell.edu/ wex/qualified_immunity (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
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the courts and police force by limiting the number and quality of
claims an individual can make against officers. The words “clearly
established” however, have become something of a Pandora’s Box,
producing decisions in federal courts that defy a clear pattern. 2
Specifically, the question of when a right becomes “clearly
established” has dogged the Supreme Court. The impact of recent
qualified immunity decisions creates a framework in which courts
are permitted to rule on cases without determining if there is an
established right. As a result, instead of creating a growing body of
literature on what is and is not an established right, the development
of constitutional jurisprudence stagnates. Further, the public-facing
impacts of qualified immunity doctrine have seemingly ignored
victims while providing dubious benefits to the communities and
the judicial system. This paper examines the modern trends in the
qualified immunity doctrine which permit and encourage
constitutional stagnation, and the harms created by qualified
immunity and exacerbated by its modern interpretations. Its goal is
to lay the foundation for a discussion of more radical solutions to
the qualified immunity problem specifically, to ask if it is time to
eliminate the doctrine altogether.
THE EVOLUTION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. Saucier, Katz, and Mandatory Sequencing
The most prominent decision in the early history of qualified
immunity was Harlow v. Fitzgerald, which reiterated the dual
purposes of common-law immunity standards: “to shield them from
undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling
threats of liability.” 3 However Harlow, relying on several other
Supreme Court decisions, etched into the annals of qualified
immunity jurisprudence that officers should be shielded from civil
liability, insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. 4 As we will see, the definition of “clearly

2. See Colin Rolfs, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 468 (2011).
3. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
4. See id.; see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
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established” will become one of paramount importance, and a
challenge with which the courts continue to struggle.
In 2001, the Supreme Court ruled on Saucier v. Katz and further
developed the standard for qualified immunity. 5 The court
identified two distinct hurdles that a plaintiff must clear: First,
“[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,
do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a
Constitutional right?”6 And second, “[i]f a violation could be made
out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions [was the right]
clearly established?” 7 The term “clearly established” was further
defined in Saucier to mean that it must have been “clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.”8
Embedded in this decision was a comment on judicial
sequencing. Under Saucier, to determine if a Plaintiff could defeat
summary judgment, the court used a two-tier procedure: first, did
the officer violate a constitutional right, and second, was that right
clearly established?9 If the answer to either of these questions is no,
the Plaintiff has not met their burden of proof and qualified
immunity will prevent her from receiving relief. 10 However,
Saucier required the court to make a constitutional determination,
even if it was clear that the law was not clearly established. 11
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted that the first step
ruling on the question of immunity was a threshold question:
“[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,
do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a
Constitutional right?”12 In practical terms, this meant that for every
civil action against a police officer, there would at least be a ruling
on if the conduct in question violated a constitutional right. In
theory, rights that were not clearly established in one case, would
become clearly established for subsequent cases.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
See id. at 201.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Rolfs, supra note 2, at 473.
See supra note 2, at 473.
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In the following decade, there was substantial push-back on
what has been termed “mandatory sequencing.” 13 In several
dissenting opinions, Justices Breyer, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Stevens
expressed their view that mandatory sequencing would be overlyburdensome on the courts and did not improve the quality of
qualified immunity analysis in the lower courts. 14 In Brosseau v.
Haugen, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer in a
concurring opinion in which he wrote:
I . . . express my concern about . . . the way in which lower courts
are required to evaluate claims of qualified immunity under the
Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz. I am concerned that the current
rule rigidly requires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult
constitutional questions when there is an easier basis for the decision
(e.g., qualified immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve the case
before the court. Indeed when courts’ dockets are crowded, a rigid
“order of battle” makes little administrative sense . . . 15

In a more prosaic opinion Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, stated in Morse v. Frederick, “I would end the failed Saucier
experiment now.”16
Mandatory sequencing’s opponents made no secret of their
concern about logistics and administration. The criticism most
commonly made was that mandatory sequencing would make
litigation unnecessarily lengthy, and thus interfere with the regular
activities of police officers. 17 As one of the underlying goals of
qualified immunity in common law as well as landmark cases such
as Harlow, that criticism is valid if we make a few assumptions.18
First, that mandatory sequencing would substantially increase the
time police officers spend litigating claims against them. 19 We
could go further and suggest that it is an assumption that increasing
police officers’ time in the court room would substantially interfere
with the administration of justice overall. Second, that the value of
Constitutional articulation in the lower courts and the development
13. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity,
89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 15–23 (2015).
14. See, e.g., Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (2004).
15. 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004).
16. 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007).
17. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
18. See generally Harlow, 457 U.S. 800; see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511.
19. See Neilson & Walker, supra note 13, at 26; see also Rolfs, supra note 2, at
477–78.
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of a body of jurisprudence relating to what is “clearly established”
is insignificant compared with logistical and administrative
concerns. The first is a question of fact and the second of judgment,
and both will be addressed later in this paper.
For our current purposes, these assumptions bring into sharp
relief the values that the Supreme Court was bringing to the
discussion of qualified immunity. At least under Saucier the Court
decided that, whatever logistical burden it may impose, mandatory
sequencing was necessary to advance the law. 20 Looking more
broadly, it would not be reaching to believe that the proponents of
mandatory sequencing were concerned about the very thing—
stagnation and an overbroad interpretation of qualified immunity—
that would come to pass in Pearson.21
B. Pearson and Graham; Not Much Hope
In 2009, the Supreme Court heard Pearson v. Callahan, and
overruled Saucier, discarding this mandatory procedure. 22 In its
place, it gave courts the discretion to avoid the constitutional
question if they could find that the right was not clearly
established.23 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito stated:
[W]e conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often
appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The
judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be
permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the
two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed
first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.24

For civil actions against police officers under Pearson, if a judge
determines that the right in question is not clearly established, that
judge need not determine if there had been a constitutional
violation.25 The action would produce no precedent. The majority,
however, seemed confident that giving discretion to the lower courts
to determine which prong of the qualified immunity analysis they
20. See generally Saucier, 533 U.S. 194.
21. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); see also Rolfs, supra note
2, at 478–80.
22. 555 U.S. 223.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 236.
25. Id.; Rolfs, supra note 2 at 479.
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would address first, if at all, they would continue to do so when the
circumstances called for it.26 In one particularly prescient statement,
Justice Alito stated: “In addition, the Saucier Court was certainly
correct in noting that the two-step procedure promotes the
development of constitutional precedent and is especially valuable
with respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases in
which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable.”27
Thus, the Pearson majority found that mandatory sequencing
was valuable as a tool to develop a body of decisions dealing with
a wide range of unique factual circumstances. 28 They believed,
however, that left to their own devices, lower courts would rule on
both prongs of the qualified immunity when the case called for it.29
This, as we will see, proved to be naïve.
With Pearson as the controlling case, the doctrine of qualified
immunity has been murky. To begin, because Pearson gave lower
courts the freedom to skip the constitutional question of if the right
in question was “clearly established,” they did.30 Often. Thus, the
body of jurisprudence from which plaintiffs could draw under
Saucier dried up under Pearson.31 Neilson explains:

26. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (“On reconsidering the procedure required in
Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate,
it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts
and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion
in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”).
27. Id.
28. Id. (“In addition, the Saucier Court was certainly correct in noting that the
two-step procedure promotes the development of constitutional precedent and is
especially valuable with respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases
in which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable.”).
29. Id.
30. Neilson & Walker, supra note 13 at 29 (citing Rolfs, supra note 2 at 49798, concluding that “there is a significantly high probability that Pearson has had
an actual effect on the rate at which circuit courts avoid constitutional
determinations”); see also Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring
Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 625 (2011) (examining every
published court of appeals case that cited Pearson from 2009 to 2010 and finding
that the court avoided constitutional questions in 19.5% of cases).
31 . See John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for Unnecessary
Constitutional Ruling in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
403, 410 (1999).
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Rights only become clearly established as a result of a court holding
that, on a particular set of facts, there was a constitutional violation.
If a court makes no constitutional determination after denying a
plaintiff a remedy because the law was not dearly established by a
previous decision with analogous facts, a remedy will be denied in a
later case with a similar violation, because the right is still not clearly
established. In this way, constitutional violations can indefinitely go
without being remedied, and officials can continuously engage in
unconstitutional conduct.32

Beyond the freedom to skip constitutional questions afforded to
judges under Pearson, research suggests that judges often reverseengineer the answers to constitutional questions based on their
knowing that the defendant will be granted qualified immunity.33
Researchers from the College of William and Mary found that
judges are reluctant to acknowledge a constitutional violation where
they subsequently intend to grant qualified immunity.34 They wrote:
In an effort to avoid [cognitive] dissonance, therefore, judges mayentirely unintentionally-allow their beliefs about whether a
government officer is entitled to qualified immunity to influence
their analysis of whether a constitutional violation occurred at all.35

In essence, this is a direct rebuke of Justice Alito’s hopes that
lower courts would make a good-faith effort to address both prongs
of the qualified immunity analysis when the circumstances called
for it. Constitutional stagnation is not merely boon for abstract legal
discussions. The ability of courts to skip the Constitutional question
has made it quantifiably more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in
civil actions against police officers.36
Apart from Constitutional stagnation, Pearson-style qualified
immunity analysis is again murky when it comes to novel factual
circumstances. In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court again
addressed nuanced questions of qualified immunity applicability.37
In this particular case, they arrived at a conclusion that suggested
32. Rolfs, supra note 2 at 479.
33. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical
Analysis, 66 (2009). Faculty Publications. available at
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/66.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 13 at 29.
37. See 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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that previous cases a plaintiff is using to claim that the officer acted
unreasonable needs to be appropriately specific to the factual
circumstances in their case.38 They wrote:
The validity of the claim must then be judged by reference to the
specific constitutional standard which governs that right, rather than
to some generalized “excessive force” standard.39

Inconveniently, the court left wide open what an “appropriate
level of specificity” was to be.40 In subsequent cases, courts found
even egregious violators of Constitutional rights to be immune from
liability because the case law the plaintiffs cited as on point were
not similar enough to give the defendant officer notice that their
actions were wrong.41 Other times, it seemed that the court was not
asking for similarity, but identical circumstances.42
The Supreme Court addressed this problem in Hope v. Pelzer, a
case that attempted to rein in the scope of qualified immunity
application.43 Hope found that “officials can still be on notice that
their conduct violates established law even in novel factual

38. See id.
39. Id. at 394.
40. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640; see also Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); Neilson & Walker, supra note 13 at 397.
41. See Suissa v. Fulton Cty., Ga., 74 F.3d 266 (11th Cir. 1996) (abrogated by
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)) (Suisa, a government employee, alleged
that he and the other defendant were discriminated against because they were
Jewish. Fulton County Marshal Captain asked Suisa to write a report detailing his
grievances, whereupon the captain allegedly threatened Suisa to influence the
contents of Suisa’s report. The appellate court concluded that, despite several
decisions that were on point and that defendants should have known of, the
decisions do not “dictate, that is truly compel . . . the conclusion that an
unsuccessful attempt to prevent protected speech violates the First
Amendment.”).
42 . See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, (2011) (“a government
official’s conduct violates clearly established law when at the time of the
challenged conduct the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that every
reasonable office would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right . . . we do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” (internal
citations omitted)); See generally Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky, & Martin A.
Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs,
29 TOURO L. REV. 633, 651-656 (2012-2013).
43. See 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
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circumstances.”44 The standard they established was that the state
of the law needed to give officers “fair warning” that the officer’s
conduct was illegal.45 As Rolfs points out, “[t]his holding greatly
relaxed the standard that was purportedly announced in Saucier,
making it ‘much easier for civil rights plaintiffs’ to overcome
qualified immunity.” 46 In retrospect, Hope seems out of place
during a time when decision after decision affirmed a broad
application of qualified immunity that unequivocally favored the
interests of government actors over alleged victims. However, in
subsequent cases involving unnecessary force, courts seemed to
ignore Hope as an outlier because the conduct of the government
actor so obviously violated established law that case law with
similar circumstances was not necessary.47
With the standards for similar factual circumstances so unclear,
it is poignant to look at one of the key justifications in Pearson for
allowing judges to skip the constitutional question. 48 The words
speak for themselves:
Although the first prong of the Saucier procedure is intended to
further the development of constitutional precedent, opinions
following that procedure often fail to make a meaningful
contribution to such development. For one thing, there are cases in
which the constitutional question is so factbound that the decision
provides little guidance for future cases.49

In other words, Pearson tells us that many mandatory
sequencing decision hold little value because they are overly
“factbound” and are unlikely to contribute to further jurisprudence.
Therefore, they argue, it would be a better use of judicial resources
44. Id. at 741.
45. Id.
46. See Philip Sheng, An “Objectively Reasonable” Criticism of the Doctrine
of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases Brought Under 42 U.S.C § 1983,
26 BYU J. PUB. L. 99, 107 (2012).
47 . See Hope, 536 U.S. at 730.; See also Sheng, supra note 46 at 107
(“[i]nterestingly however, in the only excessive force case to be heard since Hope
where clearly established was at issue, the Court seemed to completely ignore
Hope.”).
48. See 555 U.S. at 237.
49 . Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 388
(counseling against the Saucier two-step protocol where the question is “so fact
dependent that the result will be confusion rather than clarity”)).
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if lower courts skipped this analysis if the constitutional ruling will
be too fact-specific.50 That same court then held in Graham that any
plaintiff claiming that government officers should not be afforded
qualified immunity must present evidence of appropriate specificity
showing that the officer should have known they were acting
unreasonably. 51 The very “factbound” determinations that would
have been mandatory under Saucier and could satisfy the specificity
requirement under Graham are discouraged and unavailable under
Pearson. Whether the Graham court anticipated the very broad
reading of “appropriate specificity” is uncertain. But what is certain
is that, in its current iteration, qualified immunity is closer to
absolute immunity, and a plaintiff’s burden is almost
insurmountable.
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Setting aside, for now, the impact that this legal catch-22 has on
victims of police violence and other misconduct, qualified
immunity presents another profound challenge: the discovery and
implementation of rights and remedies. 52 Constitutional scholar
Owen Fisk described the separate duties of courts of “discovering
the meaning of constitutional values such as equality, liberty, or
property . . . [and] fashioning the most effective strategy for
actualizing those values.” 53 Qualified immunity in its current
iteration does not encourage courts to make decisions and analyze
questions with the goal of discovering constitutional values. 54
50 . See generally, id. at 236-37 (“The [mandatory sequencing] procedure
sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on
difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case. There are cases
in which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from
obvious whether in fact there is such a right. District courts and courts of appeals
with heavy caseloads are often understandably unenthusiastic about what may
seem to be an essentially academic exercise.”).
51. 490 U.S. at 397.
52. See generally, Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51
(1979).
53. Id.
54 . See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in
Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120 (“For rights that depend on
vindication through damage actions, the repeated invocation of qualified
immunity will reduce the meaning of the Constitution to the lowest plausible
conception of its content. Functionally, the Constitution will be defined not by
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Notably, the ability for courts to sidestep constitutional questions
retards the “discovery” of true rights. In similar fashion, the courts’
treatment of victims has established a “rights-backwards” approach
that has curtailed the scope of Constitutional rights.
A. Discovering Rights
The judiciary has a unique role with regard to individual rights.
In one sense, they are purely instrumental of the legislature. The
courts do not get to “discover” rights in that they do not get to write
legislation that either expands or curtails the expression of some
abstract concept of a right. On the other hand, however, courts act
as illuminators of “true rights” – that is, the pursuit of a perfect
application of the abstract to the concrete. Whenever the legislature
writes laws or statutes, the courts are in a position to test the
application of those laws or statutes to an infinite number of factual
scenarios. If we envision each of those applications as a data points
on a graph, the composite will display the arc of our true rights.
Modern qualified immunity starves our legal system of
constitutional jurisprudence and severely hampers our discovery of
rights.
Many understand the Constitution is not a static document
without nuance. Branches of legal study and political philosophy
have been dedicated to the explication of the Constitution in everevolving contexts. That is not to make a statement on interpretivism
or framers’ intent—even Justices Scalia and Ginsburg would agree
that the text of the Constitution must be interpreted in order for it to
have any value to specific circumstances.
Assume ad absurdum that some combination of the Supreme
Court and lower courts had addressed literally every factual
circumstance and articulated the Constitutional outcome
satisfactorily. We would have a perfect outline of those things
which were permitted and those which were not; we would have
actualized the concept of “true rights”. Christopher Eisgruber writes
that “[f]rom the vantage of the Constitution, accordingly, ‘rights’
are mandatory constraints upon government” which “attach to states
what judges, in their wisdom, think it does or should mean, but by the most
grudging conception that an executive officer could reasonably entertain.”).
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of affairs which are required by the Constitution.”55 In this sense,
every time that the Constitution is applied to a novel circumstance,
we get one step closer to a perfect understanding of our own true
rights—or the “state of affairs required by the Constitution”—and
how to conduct ourselves so as to not infringe upon the rights of
others.56
Insofar as we assume that the Constitution is the ideal
framework for balancing rights and promoting net benefits,
developing this understanding of the Constitution applied to any
number of circumstances is essential to bringing us closer to a
perfect, Constitutional republic. That is, there is a correlative
relationship between the sheer number of constitutional questions
that a court answers and the discovery of our constitutional values.
That is not to say that all jurisprudence makes a meaningful
contribution to our understanding of the Constitution and the rights
implicated therein. Rolfs characterized the argument that
Constitutional articulation—answering the Constitutional question
in all qualified immunity cases—may lead to bad precedent.
“Mandatory sequencing may force courts to decide constitutional
questions with insufficient information…[a] court opinion written
[with insufficient information] may not be helpful to other courts.”57
All things considered, proponents of this argument will say, it would
be wiser for courts to skip the constitutional question. Essentially,
the argument goes, bad facts make bad law, and the nature of claims
involving qualified immunity inherently contain bad facts.58
Assuming that mandatory sequencing in fact leads to more
“bad” law, there are two main flaws with this argument. The first
one I have already addressed: the requirement under Pearson and
Graham for factually similar circumstances with “appropriate
specificity” would suggest that any case law, no matter how
insufficiently developed, might be helpful for future litigation.
The second shortcoming in this argument is that it fails to see
the bigger picture. Critiques on logistical shortcomings such as the
possibility for bad law seem to implicate an underlying invalidity in
55. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and
Religious Liberty after City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 88
(1997).
56. Id.
57. Rolfs, supra note 2 at 483.
58. See Rolfs, supra note 2 at 482.
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constitutional litigation as a whole. 59 In other words, some
opponents of mandatory sequencing see utilitarian concerns as
independent and sufficient justification to discard the whole
concept.60 Fiss’ response seems to state the obvious; that logistical
issues can be addressed with logistical solutions.61 He writes:
Like an art, [judicial communication] always seems in peril. But the
principal threats to this capacity . . . have nothing to do with structural
reform; . . . these threats to the integrity of the judicial process can
be fought in ways that leave the structural suit untouched as a
distinctive mode of constitutional litigation.62

Although the production of bad law, judicial overwork, and
burdening the court system are valid concerns, none persuasively
outweigh the value that comes from discovering rights.63
B. Discovering Remedies
Fundamentally, courts have been grappling with an unavoidable
conflict between the abstract, essentialist, capital-letter
Constitutional Rights, and the utilitarian, pragmatic constitutional
rights. 64 In one sense, the latter is a function of the former. The
judiciary (and if we are going to further suspend our cynicism, the
legislature) exists to realize our “true” Constitutional Rights by
embodying them in official decisions, laws, statutes, and, most
importantly, remedies. This view is a “rights-forward” approach
wherein the rights create the remedies. “The remedy,” writes Fiss,
“expresses the judge’s desire to give a meaning to a constitutional
value that is more tangible, more full-blooded than a mere
59. Pearson 555 U.S. at 237 (“Many constitutional determinations fail to make
meaningful contribution to [constitutional] development.”).
60. See id. at 239.
61. See Fiss at 45.
62. Id. (Fiss’ response is not specific to bad jurisprudence (he is addressing the
problem of judges being overworked), but nonetheless characterizes the
counterargument).
63. Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be developed in
the abstract— the system needs to be “fed” in order to advance and demonstrate
the arc of our true rights.
64. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 82 (1977) (Explaining crudely,
“this is the distinction between arguments of principle on the one hand and
arguments of policy on the other”).
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declaration of what a right is.”65 Daryl Levinson adds an important
point of analysis to this discussion.66 He writes,
Rights are the “true meaning of . . . constitutional values, such as
equality liberty, due process, or property . . .” Remedies are designed
to “actualize the constitutional value and incorporate considerations
that are not principled corollaries of the constitutional value but
rather are “subsidiary,” “strategic,” and “instrumental.” Thus,
remedies are “subordinate” to rights. They are not only subordinate,
but also metaphysically segregated, for “rights operate in the world
of abstraction, remedies in the world of practical reality.”67

Under a rights-forward approach, then, remedies exist
subordinate to the rights that call for them. Their value is determined
by the extent to which they actualize our abstract conceptions of
rights; how well they move from the “realm of abstraction” to the
“world of practical reality.”68 This is a symbiotic relationship with
the rights-discovering function. As jurisprudence develops a wide
body of unique factual applications of the Constitution, we get a
better understanding of the “true rights” which govern (or permit)
our actions in the republic. Remedies make our understanding of
“true rights” actionable and tangible. In a word, they make those
rights exist.
The distinction between rights-forward and rights-backward
approaches—one that is critical in our discussion of rights and
remedies in the context of qualified immunity—is not necessarily
the existence of a remedy. Although a right without any remedy is
almost certainly rights-backward (and, as Levinson would state, no
right at all) it is not the remedy’s non-existence that gives us this
insight. 69 It is the question of whether we are tailoring our
conception of the right to reflect the available or desirable remedy.
The formulation of rights in modern qualified immunity
jurisprudence is markedly rights-backward. Levinson tracks an
important and analogous evolution in cases involving constitutional
claims for unacceptable prison conditions. 70 Citing Hutto v.
65. Fiss, supra note 52 at 46.
66. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 870 (1999).
67. Id. (quoting Fiss, supra note 52 at 51–52).
68. Id. at 871.
69. See id. at 888.
70. Id. at 878–882.

Spring 2018]

Stauber

139

Finney71 and Rhodes v. Chapman72, Levinson explains how courts
can slip into rights-backward thinking.73 In Hutto and Rhodes, the
courts originally found that the prison conditions violated the Eighth
Amendment. 74 That is, applied to these unique factual
circumstances, the courts discovered another contour in the “true
rights” of prisoners. In order to effectuate that true right, they need
to create some sort of remedy. In each of these cases, the prisons
eventually discarded specific objectionable practices “even though
any one or several of these conditions in isolation might not be
sufficient to trigger a constitutional violation.” 75 Because courts
often look to other courts to provide guidance on particularly
endemic problems, those remedial measures became criteria for
subsequent prison-conditions lawsuits. In other words, rather than
courts looking to the Eighth Amendment to fashion remedies
effectuating the “true rights” contained therein, they began using the
remedies offered in prior litigation to determine what rights the
victim actually had.
The rights-backward nature of prison reform litigation is not
theoretical.
Besides becoming part of the definition of the right, prison reform
remedies have also influenced the scope of the Eighth Amendment
less directly. Expansive district court structural reform of prisons
where conditions [do not meet those criteria developed in Hutto and
Rhodes] has provoked the Supreme Court to curtail the scope of the
right.76

A straight line can be drawn from Levinson’s analysis of prisoncondition litigation to qualified immunity. For one, the requirement
that any constitutional right violation be “clearly established”
suggests that a plaintiff only has a right (such as against
unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force, etc.) insofar as
that right has been established by external forces. There is no
inherency. Prior litigation does not interpret the right for the purpose

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

437 U.S. 678 (1978).
452 U.S. 337 (1981).
Levinson, supra note 66 at 878–882.
See Hutto, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
Levinson, supra note 66 at 879.
Id. at 881.
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of determining the appropriate remedy; it is part of the definition
itself.
Second, the definition of the constitutional right has been
contoured around the available remedy. Take, for example, the
majority holding in Davis v. Scherer 77, denying the plaintiff’s claim
against the defendant for violation of federal constitutional rights;
It would become more difficult, not only for officials to anticipate
the possible legal consequences of their conduct, but also for trial
courts to decide even frivolous suits without protracted litigation.
Nor is it always fair, or sound policy, to demand official compliance
with statute and regulation on pain of money damages. Such officials
as police officers or prison wardens, . . . routinely make close
decisions in the exercise of the broad authority that necessarily is
delegated to them. These officials are subject to a plethora of rules,
“often so voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in such
flux that officials can only comply with or enforce them
selectively.”(citation omitted).78

The scope of the plaintiff’s rights is predicated on the ability of
the court to create and implement a remedy.79 Fiss describes this as
the “tailoring principle,” which, in his words, “also obscures the
criteria of choice in suggesting that the violation will be the
exclusive source of the remedy: it suggests that the shape of the
remedy is exclusively a function of the definition of the violation.”80
Insofar as Pearson requires that for any violation to be actionable,
it must be of a clearly established constitutional right of which a
reasonable person would know, the remedy is a function of the
violation.
As it relates to Levinson’s concern that rights-backward
formulations will lead courts to curtail the scope of the right 81 ,
qualified immunity doctrine echoes the pattern in prison-condition
litigation. First, the right in question—here, the right against
unreasonable force, unreasonable search and seizure, etc.—is
tailored to the remedy. What is available as a remedy to these
violations is a lawsuit for compensatory damages if and only if the
Pearson criteria are met. In that sense, those rights have Pearson
baked in—you do not have an absolute right against unreasonable
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

468 U.S. 183, 206 (1984).
Id. at 196.
See generally Levinson, supra note 66 at 870.
Fiss, supra note 52 at 48.
See Levinson, supra note 66.

Spring 2018]

Stauber

141

police, but you have a right against unreasonable police force where
the officer should have known that he was violating a right. Because
of public policy considerations like those articulated in Davis, we
as a society choose not to provide a remedy for unreasonable police
force where the officer was acting reasonably. Thus, our conception
of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable force is
tailored to fit around the Davis concerns. “A subtle inversion of
right and remedy thus occurs[,]” writes Levinson, “[r]emedies are
used by courts to define a constitutional standard that would
otherwise be impossible to articulate, and those remedies become
the normative criteria by which constitutional violations are
judged.”82
Second, the rights-backward state of qualified immunity leads
to courts curtailing the scope of individual rights. If we imagine the
formulation of rights and remedies as a road, the first trip is from
remedy to rights, as discussed above. Once we have arrived at the
right by way of the remedy, that is, we have a definition of the right
that is subordinate to the remedy, courts use that right to create and
apply a remedy. As Fiss explains,
[T]he tailoring principle fundamentally misleads. It does in fact tend
to support an artificial conception of "violation" – one that looks back
and that sees discrete incidents as the object of the remedy – but it
also errs in an even more basic way. It suggests that the relationship
between remedy and violation is deductive or formal, and thereby
gives us an impoverished notion of remedy.83

It is this “impoverished notion of remedy” that provides the annals
of qualified immunity litigation with some of its most egregious
miscarriages of justice.84
82. Id. at 880.
83. Fiss, supra note 52 at 47.
84. See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (holding that there
was no clearly established right against police officers using lethal force to end a
high-speed car chase); Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S.
364, 379 (2009) (affirming the grant of qualified immunity for a middle school
assistant principal and school nurse who conducted a strip search on a 13-yearold student, writing, “the cases viewing school strip searches differently from the
way we see them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and
dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior
statement of law.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, How the Supreme Court
Protects Bad Cops, N. Y. TIMES (2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/
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OUTSIDE OF THE COURTROOM: QUALIFIED IMMUNITIES VICTIMS
AND FICTIONS
A. Judicial Notice
Beyond the abstract, one important function of constitutional
and doctrinal development is the notice-giving function that has for
government officers. Again, assuming that the Constitution creates
a framework for the most effective, fair, and just system of
governance, we conclude that giving guidance to government
officers on how to more closely adhere to the Constitution will get
us closer to a “perfect” society of law and order. The more officers
know what they can and cannot do, and the more specific each of
those imperatives is, the closer society comes to an ideal realization
of its rights. In this sense, Pearson fails us because it allows
repeated violations of citizens’ rights without a judicial
determination that would deter such conduct in future cases. Jack
Beermann, Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law,
writes,
In some circumstances, repeated immunity findings can cause the
law to stagnate. With regard to constitutional claims that are likely
to be litigated only in the constitutional tort context, officials might
repeatedly engage in the same conduct and successfully defend
damages suits with qualified immunity, leaving the scope of
constitutional rights undetermined.85

In principle, the function of the “clearly established” prong of
qualified immunity analysis is to give a notice to police officers and
provide guidance for future conduct. 86 A large issue arises,
27/opinion/how-the-supreme-court-protects-bad-cops.html?_r=0 (“for ex-ample,
the officer who shot Michael Brown can be held liable only if every reasonable
officer would have known that the shooting constituted the use of excessive force
and was not self-defense.”); see also Alan K. Cheng, Qualified Immunity Limiting
Access to Justice and Impeding Development of the Law, 41 ABA HUM. RTS.
MAG.
(2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/
human_rights_magazine_home/2015--vol--41-/vol--41--no--1---lurking-in-theshadows--the-supreme-court-s-qui/qualified-immunity-limiting-access-tojustice-and-impeding-devel.html.
85. Jack Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance.2009
Sup. Ct. Rev. 139, 141 (2009).
86. See Neilson & Walker, supra note 13 at 24.
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therefore, when courts stop ruling on the Constitutional question in
these cases; police do not receive judicial guidance. Nielson writes,
“if courts do not exercise their discretion to decide questions in
[constitutionally uncertain cases], there would be a ‘significant
possibility that conscientious law enforcement officers will be
deprived of needed judicial guidance . . . .’”87 There are an infinite
number of factual circumstances that involve a Constitutional
question. Creating a wealth of rulings and opinions is an effective
way to keep doctrine and police procedure as “fresh” as possible.88
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Stephen Reinhardt
voiced his particular concern with the issue of judicial notice and
advancing technology.89 He writes,
At a time in which it is vital for constitutional law to keep pace with
changes in technology, social norms, and political practices, this
trend toward granting immunity while failing to articulate
constitutional rights will surely have far-reaching, negative
repercussions.90

One area where we can see just how aberrant this notion is—
that technology will continue to advance without the law developing
to guide its use by law enforcement—is in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Early landmark Fourth Amendment cases
demonstrated the Supreme Court’s interest—one might even say
obsession—with examining the scope and permissibility of new
technologies. 91 As technology and law enforcement capabilities
develop and expand, so does the quantity of judicial opinions
relating to those capabilities. But as long as courts have the option
87. Id.
88. Rolfs, supra note 2 at 479–80.
89. See Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of
Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly
Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219 (2015).
90. Id. at 1250.
91 . See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (assessing the
constitutionality of recording defendant in a telephone booth with an electronic
recording device); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (instillation and use
of a “pen register” on defendant’s phone was not a search and no warrant was
required); Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27 (2001) (both the “use of senseenhancing technology to gather information about the interior of a home,” and
“use or thermal imaging to measure heat emanating from a home” are “searches”
under the Fourth Amendment).
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to sidestep the constitutional question, it is unlikely that judicial
guidance on questions involving technology will be satisfactorily
and prudently answered.
B. Accountability
Inversely, it is essential to be able to hold police officers
accountable for their actions. Researchers have found that effective
procedures for redressing harms caused by individual officers and
agencies are essential for reducing crime. 92 Insofar as modern
qualified immunity interpretation sets a near unobtainable standard
for plaintiffs to hold police officers accountable, it fails to achieve
its purpose.
David Bayley identifies two ways in which violating the rule of
law reduces enforcement effectiveness.93 First, “violating the ruleof-law lessens the willingness of the public to assist the police in
carrying out their assigned role.” 94 This analysis comes from the
idea that a great deal of police information comes from the public
and is offered voluntarily. Empirically, if police cannot obtain
information from the public, their chance of solving a crime
decreases substantially.95 Second, when police officers violate the
rule of law, they alienate the community they are supposed to
serve.96 Bayley suggests that this creates a cycle in which “abuse by
the police intensifies public suspicion and hostility toward the
police” which then “prompts police to exert their authority . . .
perhaps more forcibly” and restart the cycle.” 97

92. See Samuel Walker, Police Accountability: Current Issues and Research
Needs,NAT’L INST. OF JUST.(2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov /pdffiles1/nij/grants/
218583.pdf.
93 . David H. Bayley, Law Enforcement and the Rule of Law: Is There a
Tradeoff?, 2 J. CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 133 (2002) (although Bayley’s
research looked into instances in which police officers unexcusedly violated the
law, there is no reason to believe that those same effects would not be present in
cases where officers violated the law but were technically excused.)
94. Id. at 141.
95. Id. at 142 (citing Peter W. Greenwood, Jan M. Chaiken, and Joan Petersilia,
The Criminal Investigation Process, NAT’L INST. L. ENFORCEMENT & CRIM.
JUST. (1977)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 143.
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C. Chilling
One of the most touted justifications behind qualified immunity
is the fear of chilling police action. 98 This was one of the main
concerns that the majority expressed in Harlow; “the fear of civil
rights lawsuits may cause officials to be ‘overdeterred.’” 99 The
Supreme Court has previously expressed their belief that subjecting
a government official to civil liability can “dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute . . . [public officials], in the unflinching
discharge of their duties.”100
Current events, including the apparent and dramatic increase
cases of deadly force being employed on unarmed, black men, have
brought this discussion to a head. In non-academic circles, the
theory of the “Ferguson Effect” has become ubiquitous (in the
months following cases such as the shooting of Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri, many cities, especially those with marked
racial tensions, see an increase in crime.) 101 According to
proponents of the Ferguson Effect theory, this spike in crime is due
to police being deterred from vigorously performing their duties,
resulting in less-effective law enforcement. 102 Policymakers and
government officials, all the way up to the Attorney General, have
remarked on the Ferguson Effect, and the continued need for a
robust doctrine of qualified immunity.103
The project of this paper is not to discuss the multifaceted issues
raised by the Ferguson Effect. The intersections of race relations,
socioeconomic disparity, police militarization, and historic
discrimination are numerous; and undoubtedly all play a role in the
phenomena in cities such as Ferguson and Baltimore. However, it
is prudent to look to those cities as case studies that bring the
question of chilling into sharp relief. Looked at in this light,
proponents of qualified immunity and believers in the Ferguson
Effect make two very important and flawed assumptions. First, they
98. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806–07.
99. Id.
100. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
101. Shaila Dewan, Deconstructing the ‘Ferguson Effect’, N. Y. TIMES
(2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/us/politics/fergusoneffect.html?_r=0.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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assume that fear of liability does in fact deter police actions, and
second, that officials’ deterrence is necessarily and problematically
overbroad. 104 As we will see, both of these assumptions are
unfounded.
First, there has been a wealth of research on the issue of whether
fear of liability actually chills police conduct. Joanna Schwartz’
extensive and influential studies have strongly suggested that the
overdeterrence theory—the Ferguson Effect—is unfounded. One
component of official liability that is often overlooked is that
government officers, especially police officers are almost always
completely indemnified from civil judgments against them.105 The
lynchpin in the Ferguson Effect is the idea that officers so greatly
fear civil liability that they will refrain from acting in the course of
duty. It is, of course, possible that officers fear more than just the
financial component of a judgment against them. The spectacle of a
trial, the potential for termination, and the damage to one’s
reputation could all potentially contribute to the alleged
overdeterrence.106 However, in serious cases of officer misconduct,
immunity from a civil trial does not immunize the officer from the
court of public opinion. If we analyze the outcomes of officers
involved in some of the most high-profile cases of misconduct, we
find that even when there is no pre-existing heightened scrutiny of
officers—no reason for the officers to fear financial liability—
officers often suffer from public backlash.107 This suggests that the
non-financial factors cannot justify overdeterrence because officers
are always subject to repercussions from negative public opinion.
Further, research has suggested that allegations of misconduct
have little impact on internal matters such as opportunities for
promotions or performance reviews. 108 Again, officers cannot
104. See, e.g., id.
105. Lindsey De Stefan, No Man Is Above the Law and No Man Is Below It:”
How Qualified Immunity Reform Could Create Accountability and Curb
Widespread Police Misconduct, STETON HALL L. SCH. STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 2,
18 (2017) (citing Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
885, 894 n. 41 (2014) (explaining that the Court has never given any empirical
evidence to support its belief in the deterrent power of lawsuits)).
106. See, e.g., Chao Xiong, City of St. Anthony, Officer Jeronimo Yanez Part
Ways, The Star Tribune (2017), http://www.startribune.com/city-of-st-anthonyofficer-jeronimo-yanez-part-ways/433691813/.
107. See generally Dewan, supra note 101.
108. De Stefan supra note 105 at 18.
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suggest that fear of internal repercussions affect their actions in the
field because, frankly, they do not suffer internal repercussions.109
Summarizing many of the conclusions reached in Schwartz’ papers,
Lindsey De Stefan adds, “in many instances, even the police
department that employs the officer suffers no direct financial
consequences.”110 Often, the costs of litigation and judgments are
factored into a city or department’s budget as a cost-of-doingbusiness expense.111 Essentially, when neither the individual officer
nor the supervising department suffers any significant consequence
from an officer’s misconduct, we cannot consider internal
repercussions a realistic source of the overdeterrence alleged by the
Ferguson Effect.
What we are left with is the financial liability; proponents of
the Ferguson Effect must rest their argument on the idea that
officers fear the prospect of having to personally satisfy a judgment
against them, and therefore are deterred from acting. On this narrow
formulation, Schwartz’ research is again instructive; “While
officers consistently report that the threat of liability deters
misconduct, the threat of liability does not actually change most
officers’ behavior on the job.” 112
Second, we need to consider a question that proponents of the
Ferguson Effect theory often take for granted: what behavior is
(allegedly) being deterred and is that deterrence necessarily
overbroad? Again, research suggests that any deterrence that does
exist primarily impacts low-quality police behaviors. 113 Data on
street stops by Chicago police officers, for example, show a
dramatic decrease in frequency following the release of video
footage of the controversial shooting of Laquan McDonald.114 If the
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1077-78
(2010).
113. “Low-quality” is this author’s term meant to differentiate those police
behaviors that are sanctimoniously guarded by qualified-immunity advocates and
those which a reasonable observer would agree are not valuable to effective law
enforcement.
114 . John A. Shjarback et. al., De-Policing in the Wake of Ferguson:
Radicalized Changes in the Quantity and Quality of Policing Among Missouri
Police Departments, 50 J. CRIM. JUST. 42, 44, (2017)(quoting Rob Arthur &
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decrease in street stops in fact led to an increase in crime, we could
reliably vindicate the Ferguson Effect. However, when the rate of
police stops in Chicago decreased, there was no significant increase
in crime. 115 In fact, researchers suggest that although the overall
number of stops decreased, the quality of these stops improved.116
This seems to answer our question; in the Chicago case study, the
deterred behavior was frivolous street stops and searches. 117 If the
deterrent effect of liability only touches behaviors such as these,
shown to be empirically inefficient and qualitatively discriminatory,
we ought not be concerned with overdeterrence. 118
D. Image
1. Domestic
For most members of a community, the legal intricacies of
qualified immunity will not matter. The important thing to most
citizens is the optics; police officers who violated an individual’s
rights are getting off without so much as a reprimand.119 Indeed, the
judicial system itself is complicit in this violation. As it relates to
image, a lesson that policymakers seem to forget is that perception
is reality. Professor Wayne Logan theorizes that “public perceptions
of procedural justice can influence citizen willingness to comply
with the law and assist police.” 120 Further, Logan asserts that
instances in which flagrant violations of individual liberty, such as
warrantless and unreasonable searches, are excused, the effect is to
“lessen confidence in the perceived fairness and legitimacy of
police.”121

Jeff Asher, Gun Violence Spiked–And Arrests Declined–In Chicago Right After
The Laquan McDonald Video Release, FiveThirtyEight (2016),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/gun-violence-spiked-and-arrests-declined-inchicago-right-after-the-laquan-mcdonald-video-release/).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 17–22.
117. Dewan, supra note 101.
118. See generally Shjarback et. al., supra note 114 at 11-17.
119. See Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L. J. 69, 93
(2012).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Negative perception of the police and courts is especially
poignant in minority communities, where the perception that police
officers can act with virtual impunity “can only lessen confidence
in the perceived fairness and legitimacy of police, already strained
by reports of police fabrications and racial bias.”122 Judge Stephen
Reinhardt has remarked that “the Court’s recent treatment of . . .
qualified immunity evinces a lack of sensitivity to the unequal
treatment of minorities in our criminal justice system.”123
2. International
Beyond our borders too, the world takes notice when the United
States denies justice to victims of institutional abuse and violence.
The United Nations Human Rights Council issued a scathing
condemnation of United States’ police violence practices,
recommending:
[The United States should] [E]nsure that all instances of police
brutality and excessive use of force by law enforcement officers were
investigated promptly, effectively and impartially by an independent
mechanism, with no institutional or hierarchical connection between
the investigators and the alleged perpetrators; and provide effective
remedies and rehabilitation to the victims.124

Other recommendations from other committees within the
United Nations Human Rights Council included that the United
States “should ensure that reports of brutality and ill-treatment of .
. . vulnerable groups by its law-enforcement are . . . thoroughly
investigated and that perpetrators are . . . appropriately punished.”125
One report concerning the torture of criminal suspects by Chicago
police officers was especially concerned with lack of remedy
122. Id.
123. Reinhardt, supra note 49 at 1251.
124. U.N. Human Rights Council, Compilation Prepared by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/WG6/22/USA/2, at 9 (2015) (available at https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/039/92/PDF/G1503992.pdf).
125. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and
Recommendations of the Committee against Torture, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/USA/CO/2, at 9 (July 25, 2006) (available at http://undocs.org/
CAT/C/USA/CO/2).
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provided to the victims. 126 It noted that, although many of the
victims have been exonerated of the crimes for which they were
detained, “the vast majority . . . have not received any compensation
for the extensive injuries suffered . . . .”127
Perhaps the body most on point in their recommendations is
Amnesty International. In a comment to an UNHRC declaration on
the Right to Life, Amnesty International commented:
the right to life should include, as appropriate, all recognized forms
of reparation, including: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, illustrating specific
measures that may be appropriate, taking into account the specific
harm caused in each case, for each form.128

It is uncertain whether Amnesty International made this comment
with United States’ policies in mind, but its suggestion certainly
connotes that the United States has an impoverished vision of the
Right to Life. It is itself telling that criticism from a human rights
body, so often leveled at dictatorial regimes and third-world
autocrats, could apply equally to those countries as to the United
States.
At the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2015, attending
countries offered recommendations to the United States ranging
from the broad; “[We recommend the United States] [s]trengthen
the existing mechanisms to prevent the excessive use of force and
discriminatory practices in police work,”129 to the jarringly specific;
“[We recommend the United States] [c]ollaborate closely with
marginalized communities to fix the problems in the justice system
126. Id.
127. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined
third to fifth periodic reports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/C/USA/CO/3-5, at 13-14 (Dec. 19, 2014) (available at
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/247/23/PDF/
G1424723.pdf?OpenElement).
128. The UN Human Rights Committee’s Proposed General Comment On the
Right to Life: Amnesty International’s Preliminary Observations, Amnesty
International, at 13 (June 12, 2005), https://www.amnesty.org/download/
Documents/IOR4016442015ENGLISH.pdf.
129. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review: United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/12, at 22 (July
2o,
2015)
(available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/
RegularSessions/Session30/Documents/A_HRC_30_12_ENG.docx).
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that continues to discriminate against them despite recent waves of
protest over racial profiling and police killings of unarmed black
men.”130
Although it is questionable what weight countries actually give
to recommendations from international human rights bodies, one
thing that is certain is that the United States takes part in those
assessments and itself issues recommendations to other countries.
For example, in the same UNHRC summit in which Namibia and
Peru made recommendations about the United States’ justice
system, the United States suggested:
[Namibia] [a]mend the labour law to address the inconsistency with
regard to the minimum age to work and the school age for
compulsory education, as well as more vigorously enforce the labour
laws related to child labour (United States of America);131

and
[Peru] [e]nsure timely prosecution of human rights cases before the
National Criminal Court and that all alleged violations of human
rights, including labour rights, are investigated and prosecuted by the
civilian justice system (United States of America);132

The hypocrisy is blatant. But beyond the principle that countries
in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones, the ability for the United
States to carry out its foreign policy goals, especially humanitarian
goals that involve influencing foreign legislation through
diplomacy, is hampered when it does not practice what it
preaches.133 Consider, for example, how the phenomenon of police
130. Id. at 21.
131. U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review: Namibia, at 21 (Mar. 21, 2011) (available at
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/122/97/PDF/
G1112297.pdf?OpenElement).
132. U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review: Peru, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/15, at 19 (Dec. 17, 2012)
(available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/
RegularSession/Session22/AHRC2215_English.pdf).
133. See, e.g., Anna A. Koptyaeva, The international image of the state as an
instrument of soft power, 23 ARCTIC AND NORTH 15, 15 (2016) (“Constructing
and advancing the international image of the country has become an importan[t]
issue. In an era of globalization, many states are engaged in purposeful creation
of their positive image, its development and promotion both at home and abroad
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brutality going unpunished and remedied is perceived in countries
suffering from endemic police corruption. Whether or not there is
some nuanced legal justification for the police officers escaping
liability, the rest of the world sees a system wherein rights are not
always rights, and victims of government abuse will rarely see
justice.
E. Judicial Resources
One final justification for the policy of qualified immunity has
to do with the scarcity of judicial resources. 134 The majority in
Harlow wrote:
Finally, the Court has more recently emphasized a third rationale—
constitutional litigation imposes high social costs, including the
government’s litigation expenses and the diversion of officials’
attention toward defending lawsuits rather than performing their
duties. These costs can be substantial, the Court says, because it
assumes that a significant percentage of constitutional tort claims are
frivolous.135

This is the rationale behind the idea that qualified immunity can be
granted as a matter of procedure as a 12(b)(6) motion.136 In theory,
this insulates officers not only from liability, but from the lawsuit
altogether.
The argument put forward in Harlow rests on three vital
assumptions: (1) defending against Constitutional torts would take
up a large amount of judicial time and resources, (2) the net benefit
to entertaining Constitutional tort claims is relatively low, and (3)
qualified immunity solves the problem by dismissing lawsuits
against defendant officers before any real burden has been put on
them. 137 Even without quibbling about the first, the other

through ‘soft power’ mechanisms. State[] authorities realize that it is an important
tool to protect national interests . . . attracting foreign investment[,] and
increas[ing] influence in the world.”)
134. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806–07.
135. Id. (internal citations omitted).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
137. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223 (noting the “substantial expenditure of scare
judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the
case.”); see also Rolfs, supra note 2 at 480–82.
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assumptions in this argument are both dubious and worryingly
victim-averse.
There is a factual question about whether qualified immunity
actually prevents officers from being “diverted” from their official
duties. In many cases, particularly excessive force lawsuits, the
victim and the defendant officer will have different allegations of
the facts.138 While it is true that a 12(b)(6) motion does not require
a reconciliation of the facts in the case, in qualified immunity cases
where it is clear that the Constitutional right was clearly established
but the reasonableness of the officer is at issue, it is unlikely that a
court would dismiss the suit until there was at least some
preliminary discovery.139
Take, for example, a case where a police officer repeatedly tased
a suspect, even after that suspect was prostrate on the ground. The
police officer had previously attended a mandatory training session
in which city lawyers explained the decision in Smith v. City of Troy
and advised officers how they could be compliant. 140 The victim
sued the officer, who responded that he was aware of Constitutional
limit on his ability to tase the victim under Smith, but continued to
do so because he thought that the victim had a concealed gun that
he was reaching for.141 The victim vociferously denies that he had a
gun. At the pre-trial proceedings, the city attorney could introduce
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could
be granted under 12(b)(6)—alleging that, even assuming the
victim’s version of events, there is no legally cognizable relief that
the court could grant. Philip Sheng summarized the likely outcome
of this type of scenario; “[i]n a situation. . . where a government
official is entitled to qualified immunity under one set of facts, but
not the other, summary judgment would be precluded until the
disputed facts are resolved by a jury.”142
This is a substantial carve-out of protection from lawsuits; if the
case involves a dispute over only the reasonableness requirement of
Pearson, questions of fact will allow the plaintiff to defeat the
defendant’s motion to dismiss and proceed to discovery.143 If the
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Sheng, supra note 46 at 101.
See id.
See Smith v. City of Troy, Ohio, 874 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2017).
See id.
Sheng, supra note 46 at 101.
Id.
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case advances to discovery, the plaintiff will be allowed to make
demands, take depositions, and use every tool provided by the Rules
of Civil Procedure, and the officer herself will almost certainly be
“diverted” from her duties to some extent.144 This anathema to the
purpose articulated in Harlow.
An even more basic question remains on the issue of judicial
resources: is not achieving justice for victims of police misconduct
a socially and judicially valuable undertaking? The Harlow Court’s
language makes their opinion on this question abundantly clear:
“social costs [of constitutional litigation] include the expenses of
litigation” and “the diversion of official energy from pressing public
issues.” 145 Framed another way, the Justices believe that
entertaining Constitutional litigation against government officers
(not even necessarily succeeding in claims against officers, just
hearing the lawsuit) is less valuable than the time they spend
listening.
A VICTIM-CENTRIC APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
As robust as is the body of analysis and criticism of qualified
immunity, there is a dearth of creative solutions. One rare exception
is James Pfander’s theory of nominal damages for Constitutional
tort judgments. 146 According to Pfander, allowing litigants to
pursue Constitutional redress against government officers, even
without the possibility for monetary damages, is sufficient to
achieve justice for victims.147 Further, nominal damages can help
close the loophole of Constitutional articulation without mandatory
sequencing; “a nominal damages claim could be an attractive option
for plaintiffs who wish to secure a judicialjudicial test of their
claim,” Pfander writes, and without potentially millions of dollars
on the line “and with it much of the justification for qualified
immunity, the suit . . . would allow the plaintiff to secure a

144. See generally, FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
145. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
146 . See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma:
Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601
(2011).
147. See generally, id.
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constitutional decision even where the law was not clearly
established.”148
Pfander’s solution is an attractive one. Not only could it solve
the problem of constitutional articulation, but it would also allow
victims of police misconduct to achieve some notion of justice. As
he points out, most victims of police misconduct are only harmed
once, and often, they seek vindication more than money. 149
However, Pfander’s solution, as with the many others that propose
to tweak or adjust current procedures, is willing to accept the many
assumptions that the Courts make. It concedes that police officers
fear personal liability and that fear of personal liability chills
officers’ actions. Further, it grants that the chilled behavior is
otherwise valuable, that lawsuits against officers divert their
attention from their official duties, and that qualified immunity in
fact keeps officers out of the courtroom. Finally, it concedes that the
Court’s time is better spent on other (undefined) matters than
entertaining victims’ lawsuits against officers.150
Rather than assuming that we need qualified immunity and then
working backwards through the many issues addressed in this
paper, it is time that we start by evaluating each of those
assumptions and determining if we need qualified immunity. The
thrust of this paper, as well as the conclusions of many prominent,
diverse, and learned scholars, suggests that the assumptions on
which courts and proponents routinely rest are flawed.
Which raises the fundamental question: when the justifications
for the policy are unsound and the damage it causes is great, is it
time to abandon the policy? Is it time to put away the tweaks and
the adjustments and admit that the machine has been broken from
the beginning?
Naturally, one of the first objections to scrapping qualified
immunity will be administrative: the courts will be overrun, judges
will be overworked, and through the megaphone we will hear that
“justice delayed is justice denied.” But administrative problems can
have administrative solutions. There is a natural threshold to how
much litigants can burden a court. As with any other lawsuit, a
plaintiff needs to compose a complaint, pay the filing fees to initiate
the suit, and complete the early pre-trial matters before any
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1607-08.
See id at 1628.
See id at 1607–08.
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substantial matter comes before a judge. Most of these would-be
plaintiffs would need to hire a lawyer. Those lawyers are bound by
professional codes of conduct which prohibit filing frivolous
claims. All of those steps would require a substantial amount of time
and effort. All things considered, the same factors that prevent
frivolous and meritless lawsuits in any matter would apply in the
context of Constitutional tort claims against government officers.
There is no reason to believe that opening up this channel of
litigation would have more of an impact on the court system than
any other.
CONCLUSION
If we truly believe that victims have a right to redress for
Constitutional harms, we cannot let the administrative concerns
shape and limit that right. If we truly believe in the rights of the
individual, we should reflect that belief in the “balancing of
interests” suggested in Harlow. 151 Chilling, clogging the courts,
and diverting officers’ attentions from their official duties are all
weights on one side of the scale, but the denial of remedies for
Constitutional violations—that is, the denial of the rights
themselves—will surely weigh more. This is the fundamental
concern of a victim-centric approach; how much do we value
Constitutional tort claims and the results they produce? It is time
that we recognized that to the Courts, that value is low, if not
negligible. It is time that we structured an approach to
Constitutional liability that does not have the government’s finger
on the scales. It is time that we made justice attainable to victims of
police misconduct, and affirmed that a right is always a right.

151.

See Harlow, 457 U.S. 223.
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